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Picture yourself in a casino sitting at the 
roulette table. Will you put your money 
on either black or red, or will you go 
for a riskier choice and place it on just a 
single number? But before you can make 
up your mind, the elderly, obese smoker 
to your right reaches for his chest and 
collapses. ‘What is wrong with him?’, 
cries his accompanying wife, looking at 
you in shock.
In this issue, Lawton and colleagues 
ask whether more experienced clinicians 
are better able to tolerate uncertainty and 
manage risks.1 Doctors working in three 
emergency departments (ED) read four 
clinical vignettes each accompanied by 
four quite distinct options for manage-
ment, all of which might be deemed clini-
cally acceptable. Participants used 5-point 
Likert scales to indicate their agreement 
with each of the management plans. By 
design, the four options offered for each 
vignette included two management plans 
one would characterise as ‘risk averse’—
requiring further tests and/or admission 
of the patient to hospital. The other two 
management plans may be seen as less 
risk averse, usually involving referring a 
patient back to the general practitioner 
or offering reassurance to the patient. 
In addition to rating their agreement 
with each of the possible management 
plans for the four vignettes, partici-
pants reported their experience (number 
of years worked in an ED setting) and 
answered a 15-item ‘Physicians Reac-
tions to Uncertainty’ scale. Analysing 
the responses from 90 doctors, who had 
worked in EDs for between 5 weeks and 
21 years, Lawton and colleagues report 
a medium to large correlation between 
experience and tolerance of risk. More 
experienced clinicians made less risk 
averse decisions.
We would like to provide three concep-
tual considerations potentially relevant to 
interpret these results from Lawton and 
colleagues and identify possible follow-up 
research.
What is risk and hoW does it 
differ from uncertainty?
Roulette serves as a classic example for 
risk: unlike any clinical situation, all 
possible outcomes are known, as are 
their respective probabilities. You only 
have to decide how much risk you can 
tolerate. Whether you are an experienced 
emergency physician or not, the unfortu-
nate gambling fellow from above poses 
a fundamentally different challenge—
an uncertain situation. You can only 
observe the patient’s obvious cardiac risk 
factors obesity and smoking and apply 
some general knowledge of the several 
life-threatening conditions that may cause 
chest pain and collapse, including, for 
instance, not just the obvious possibility 
of a heart attack, but also a blood clot in 
the lungs or possibly a dissection of the 
aorta. In addition to these usual medical 
causes to consider, however, there is also 
the possibility he may just be acting to 
avoid paying his debt.
In contrast to roulette, in uncertain 
situations we do not know all possible 
outcomes and their respective probabili-
ties. We also do not know how the likeli-
hoods of different outcomes change when 
more information becomes available. In 
fact, likelihoods quickly become non-cal-
culable in clinical practice. For instance, an 
experienced physician will be aware that 
chest pain in itself has a positive predictive 
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value of only around 20% for a heart attack and may 
also be aware that obesity doubles the risk for coronary 
artery disease. However, calculating the three most 
likely causes of collapse for a given patient such as the 
elderly obese smoker with chest pain is already next to 
impossible. Uncertainty is thus characterised by incom-
plete knowledge about the potential outcomes (there 
could be diagnoses we did not think of) and complex 
relationships between cues and criterion.2 Your profes-
sion and professional experience may change the degree 
of uncertainty the collapsing gambler poses to you, for 
example, for a medical doctor versus somebody without 
medical knowledge, but even for medical doctors it is 
an uncertain situation because they encounter it without 
the accompanying information and diagnostic possibili-
ties they would have in a hospital situation.
Emergency medicine (EM), where Lawton and 
colleagues place their study,1 is a particularly uncer-
tain—or ill-defined—environment. Decisions in EM 
often have to be based on incomplete and unreliable 
information,3 4 are made under time pressure and with 
potentially devastating consequences.4–6 However, the 
degree of uncertainty any environment poses is by no 
means independent of one’s experience in it: humans 
are outstanding in identifying among the myriad of 
cues available in any given situation, those which best 
predict the criterion of interest and then combining 
the few important cues into simple decision rules 
(‘heuristics’).7 8
This mechanism allows people to ‘become an expert 
by making routine what to the novice requires creative 
problem-solving ability.’9 It does, however, require exten-
sive exposure to the respective environment to develop. 
The more experience one has with a given situation, the 
better one will be able to foresee its future course.10 Thus, 
experience within a given field reduces uncertainty in 
that field. It is consequently of little surprise that physi-
cians with limited EM experience tend to take seemingly 
safer decisions, whereas more experienced physicians 
seem to tolerate more uncertainty as found by Lawton 
and colleagues. Instead of explaining this phenomenon 
as a tolerance of uncertainty increasing with experience 
as Lawton and colleagues conclude, we would argue 
that the EM environment simply becomes less uncertain 
over time. Physicians who have been practising in EM 
for longer increasingly regard familiar problems as less 
uncertain—that is, it is not that they tolerate uncertainty 
better so much as they have less uncertainty to tolerate.
making decisions While acknoWledging 
uncertainty
A second question is how to define tolerance of uncer-
tainty. The literature lacks a clear definition.11 Lawton 
et al operationalise tolerance of uncertainty simply as 
allowing for more risky decisions in a well-justified effort 
to reduce the number of diagnostic tests.1 And indeed, 
while junior physicians often aim for certainty as a 
prerequisite for action, more experienced physicians are 
more confident in the appropriateness of their actions 
even in situations where they do not (yet) fully under-
stand a patient’s problem.12 13 Experts become more 
‘comfortable with not knowing.’ Ilgen and colleagues 
recently reviewed the concepts of ‘comfort with uncer-
tainty’ and suggested that skilful clinicians can be 
comfortable in their management plan and at the same 
time be not completely confident about their diagnosis.14 
The reason for this is that skilful clinicians rely on their 
experience to be confident about having ruled out all 
conditions that require immediate action. They are able 
to be comfortable with their management plan while 
still being uncertain about the precise diagnosis. They 
then use an iterative process of pragmatic empiricism, 
forward planning, monitoring and ongoing reconceptu-
alisation to find the exact diagnosis. This helps them to 
maintain the ability to act even in ill-defined environ-
ments that are characterised by an inherent uncertainty. 
Junior physicians by contrast first need to obtain expe-
rience and learn how to cope with uncertainty by iden-
tifying cues to monitor their actions.15 For example, if a 
patient reacts to a treatment as expected, this signals to a 
physician that (s)he is ‘on track’, but if the patient is not 
responding to treatment, physicians need to reconsider 
their diagnosis and ask for help because the conditions 
may be beyond their abilities to control or manage.14
When humans make decisions, we not only have 
access to the internal and external cues our decision is 
based on, we also monitor our cognitive operations. 
Such metacognition enables us to recognise how confi-
dent we are in a decision,16 thus, for instance, recog-
nising when to slow down when we should17–19 and to 
over-rule first, intuitive impressions with more deliberate 
reasoning. The most prominent of these metacognitive 
impressions is fluency—the subjective impression of 
how easy or difficult a decision is.20 Several researchers 
have suggested that fluency is not an absolute judgement 
of the ease or difficulty of a given cognitive operation, 
but rather results from the difference between expected 
and experienced difficulty.20 Fluency does emerge 
from judgements and decisions, and from perception, 
retrieval or any other cognitive operation. Objects, for 
example, are fluent when we have seen them frequently 
or recently, memory is fluent when relied upon often. 
Thus, ‘the interpretation of a fluency experience relies 
on past experiences and the current context,’20 that is, 
the more exposure we have had or the more expert we 
are in a given context, the smaller the perceived diffi-
culty of operating in it. We would suggest that this 
effect also results from learning to use the right cues 
to monitor whether we are on track.15 This hypothesis 
can and should be tested, because it could inform the 
‘interventions that better support junior doctors to deal 
with uncertainty’ Lawton and colleagues call for.1 Inter-
ventions that help learners to identify the right cues to 
monitor themselves are defensible and unlikely to cause 
harm15 while for reasons of patient safety, it would obvi-
ously not be advisable to ask junior physicians to simply 
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be more risk seeking when it comes to diagnostic testing. 
As pointed out earlier, junior physicians need more 
experience to be able to make good decisions.21 We 
argue here that junior physicians need to go through the 
phase where uncertainty is acknowledged, to facilitate 
the learning process needed to develop more confidence 
and to base that confidence judgement on the right cues. 
Ultimately, this could result in reducing the number of 
tests acquired on any patient. The question is whether 
such a learning process can be facilitated in a way that 
junior physicians reach the level of expert physicians 
faster.
decision accuracy
This brings us to the third—but most crucial—question: 
what about accuracy? Regardless of how experienced we 
are within an uncertain environment, it is of little value 
if our decision is wrong. And even if a decision is right, 
we better be sure it is right for the right reasons, not just 
because it has gone well in the past.22 Otherwise, we will 
be wrong in a similar situation eventually. In previous 
research, physicians were found to be overconfident 
in their diagnoses,23 and experienced physicians in 
particular are less likely to seek advice, even when they 
were wrong.24 It has also been shown that confidence 
increases with seniority—but its calibration with accu-
racy not necessarily.25 Based on these results we would 
argue that looking only at confidence, and suggesting 
that higher is better, is in fact rather dangerous. A study 
by Friedman et al showed that medical students were 
more likely to get the diagnosis wrong than more expe-
rienced physicians, but were better calibrated than the 
more experienced physicians.26 In this study, the experi-
enced physicians were more often not confident in their 
diagnosis rather than being overconfident,26 which is 
different from the study by Meyer et al who found a 
strong effect of overconfidence.24 This is only to show 
that more research is needed to unravel the complex 
relations between adequacy, accuracy and calibration 
in conjunction with confidence, risk management and 
uncertain situations even aside from experience.
calibration is key
How do junior doctors get to the point where they can 
safely decide that no further tests are needed? Generally, 
experienced physicians are often considered to be over-
confident and junior physicians, as is shown by Lawton 
and colleagues, are less confident. However, it could 
very well be the case that even experienced physicians 
are not confident in cases with which they have little 
experience, and that junior physicians are overconfident 
in certain situations too. In the end, what really matters 
is that the level of confidence is well calibrated with 
diagnostic accuracy. We want physicians (junior physi-
cians and experienced physicians alike) to be more risk 
averse when encountering patients with symptoms they 
are unfamiliar with, while this might be an inappropriate 
course of action when they encounter a more familiar 
case. Good calibration is key for physicians of all levels 
of expertise and experience, because it will result in 
the right decisions. One way to improve calibration is 
to provide performance feedback (ie, informing physi-
cians whether their diagnosis and/or treatment was 
correct or not).27 Several recent articles have pointed 
out the poor levels of calibration and the lack of feed-
back in diagnostic reasoning.28–30 Feedback is—besides 
experience—an important prerequisite for becoming an 
expert. Physicians, especially in the ED, often do not get 
feedback about their diagnostic performance, that is, 
they do not hear back about changes in the diagnosis 
after a patient has been admitted to the ward or was 
sent home. Such feedback is essential to enable physi-
cians to recognise cues that a situation differs from the 
familiar situation they initially thought it was, and to 
decrease the potentially dangerous situation mentioned 
above of experienced physicians being confident in their 
diagnosis but still being wrong. In the field of medical 
education, interventions have been developed that have 
proven to be efficient in improving calibration of uncer-
tainty and diagnostic performance.27 Mixed deliberate 
practice with feedback is what ultimately makes novices 
expert.31 32
in conclusion
The study of Lawton and colleagues showed that expe-
rienced physicians make less risk averse decisions than 
junior physicians.1 This reflects an important difference 
in clinical decision-making, but it only represents one 
piece of the puzzle. Physicians do not know when they 
are right or wrong, which sometimes results in overcon-
fident decisions and other times in defensive medicine. 
Next steps should include studying tolerance of uncer-
tainty in combination with overconfidence and diag-
nostic accuracy to determine where most miscalibration 
occurs. Furthermore, a focus on reducing miscalibration 
using strategies to enhance feedback and identifying 
the right cues to inform confidence in judgements are 
important ways to improve clinical reasoning.
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